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Chapter 7: The Multiplier Effect in Closed and Open Economies

kapitaali.com

Algebraic Derivation and Extensions

“The multiplier is not one number but a family of numbers, indexed by the model’s assumptions about money markets, expectations, and openness.”

Cross-reference: Principles Ch. 8 (Keynesian cross and all multiplier types); Ch. 26 (open economy, import leakages); Ch. 28 (fiscal policy in practice, ARRA) [P:Ch.8, P:Ch.26, P:Ch.28]


7.1 The Keynesian Cross as a Fixed-Point Problem

Principles Chapter 8 introduced the Keynesian cross by means of a diagram: draw the 45-degree line and the expenditure function; equilibrium is their intersection. Here we reformulate this as a fixed-point problem in YY, which yields both the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium and the precise multiplier formula from a single piece of mathematics.

The goods-market equilibrium condition is:

Y=E(Y;G,T,Iˉ),E(Y)=a+b(YT)+Iˉ+G,Y = \mathcal{E}(Y; G, T, \bar{I}), \quad \mathcal{E}(Y) = a + b(Y-T) + \bar{I} + G,

where E(Y)\mathcal{E}(Y) is aggregate planned expenditure as a function of income YY (treating GG, TT, and Iˉ\bar{I} as parameters). Define the excess demand function:

ϕ(Y)E(Y)Y=a+b(YT)+Iˉ+GY=Aˉ(1b)Y,\phi(Y) \equiv \mathcal{E}(Y) - Y = a + b(Y-T) + \bar{I} + G - Y = \bar{A} - (1-b)Y,

where Aˉ=abT+Iˉ+G\bar{A} = a - bT + \bar{I} + G is autonomous expenditure. Equilibrium requires ϕ(Y)=0\phi(Y^*) = 0, i.e., Aˉ=(1b)Y\bar{A} = (1-b)Y^*, giving Y=Aˉ/(1b)=κGAˉY^* = \bar{A}/(1-b) = \kappa_G\bar{A}.

The contraction mapping argument: Consider the iteration Yn+1=E(Yn)Y_{n+1} = \mathcal{E}(Y_n). This defines a sequence (Y0,Y1,Y2,)(Y_0, Y_1, Y_2, \ldots) starting from any Y0Y_0.

Definition 7.1 (Contraction Mapping). A function f:RRf: \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R} is a contraction on R\mathbb{R} if there exists λ[0,1)\lambda \in [0,1) such that f(x)f(y)λxy|f(x) - f(y)| \leq \lambda|x - y| for all x,yx, y.

Theorem 7.1 (Banach Fixed-Point Theorem, Scalar Version). If ff is a contraction on a complete metric space, then ff has a unique fixed point xx^* and the iteration xn+1=f(xn)x_{n+1} = f(x_n) converges to xx^* from any starting point x0x_0.

Application to the Keynesian cross. The expenditure function E(Y)=Aˉ+bY\mathcal{E}(Y) = \bar{A} + bY is a contraction with Lipschitz constant b=E(Y)(0,1)b = \mathcal{E}'(Y) \in (0,1) — precisely the MPC. Since b<1b < 1, the iteration Yn+1=E(Yn)=Aˉ+bYnY_{n+1} = \mathcal{E}(Y_n) = \bar{A} + bY_n converges to the unique fixed point Y=Aˉ/(1b)Y^* = \bar{A}/(1-b) from any starting income Y0Y_0.

The speed of convergence: YnY=bnY0Y|Y_n - Y^*| = b^n|Y_0 - Y^*|. Each “round” of the multiplier process — firms produce, workers earn income, households spend fraction bb, firms produce again — shrinks the gap from equilibrium by factor bb. After nn rounds, the remaining gap is bnb^n of the original.

Definition 7.2 (The Keynesian Multiplier). The Keynesian (government spending) multiplier is:

κG=YG=11b.\kappa_G = \frac{\partial Y^*}{\partial G} = \frac{1}{1-b}.

It equals the sum of the geometric series n=0bn=1/(1b)\sum_{n=0}^\infty b^n = 1/(1-b): the first-round effect (1 dollar of spending), plus the second-round effect (bb dollars of induced consumption), plus the third round (b2b^2), and so on.


7.2 All Six Multipliers: Complete Algebraic Derivation

The Keynesian cross with proportional income tax rate tt (so tax revenue is T=tY+T0T = tY + T_0 with lump-sum component T0T_0) and transfer payments TRTR:

Y=a+b(YtYT0+TR)+Iˉ+G.Y = a + b(Y - tY - T_0 + TR) + \bar{I} + G.

Collecting terms:

Y[1b(1t)]=abT0+bTR+Iˉ+GAˉeff.Y[1 - b(1-t)] = \underbrace{a - bT_0 + bTR + \bar{I} + G}_{\bar{A}^{eff}}.

Definition 7.3 (Effective Multiplier Denominator). The expression 1b(1t)1 - b(1-t) is the effective leakage rate: the fraction of each dollar of income that “leaks out” of the spending stream through saving (1b)(1-b) and taxes on marginal income (bt)(bt).

Y=Aˉeff1b(1t)κeffAˉeff.Y^* = \frac{\bar{A}^{eff}}{1 - b(1-t)} \equiv \kappa^{eff}\bar{A}^{eff}.

Multiplier 1 — Government spending multiplier:

μG=YG=11b(1t).\mu_G = \frac{\partial Y^*}{\partial G} = \frac{1}{1-b(1-t)}.

Multiplier 2 — Lump-sum tax multiplier:

μT0=YT0=b1b(1t).\mu_{T_0} = \frac{\partial Y^*}{\partial T_0} = \frac{-b}{1-b(1-t)}.

Multiplier 3 — Proportional tax rate multiplier:

μt=Yt=bY[1b(1t)]2[1b(1t)]Yt0=bY1b(1t)<0.\mu_t = \frac{\partial Y^*}{\partial t} = \frac{-bY^*}{[1-b(1-t)]^2} \cdot [1-b(1-t)] - \frac{\partial Y^*}{\partial t}\cdot0 = \frac{-bY^*}{1-b(1-t)} < 0.

A higher tax rate reduces the effective multiplier and, at any given income level, reduces equilibrium income. The effect depends on YY^* itself (because the tax base is income), making this a nonlinear comparative static.

Multiplier 4 — Transfer payment multiplier:

μTR=YTR=b1b(1t)=bμG.\mu_{TR} = \frac{\partial Y^*}{\partial TR} = \frac{b}{1-b(1-t)} = b\cdot\mu_G.

Transfers are less stimulative than direct spending: a dollar of transfers raises disposable income by one dollar, of which only fraction bb is spent. A dollar of government purchases creates a full dollar of first-round demand.

Multiplier 5 — The Balanced-Budget Multiplier (Haavelmo’s theorem):

Suppose ΔG=ΔT0=ΔB\Delta G = \Delta T_0 = \Delta B (spending and lump-sum taxes increase equally):

ΔY=μGΔB+μT0ΔB=11b(1t)ΔBb1b(1t)ΔB=1b1b(1t)ΔB.\Delta Y^* = \mu_G\Delta B + \mu_{T_0}\Delta B = \frac{1}{1-b(1-t)}\Delta B - \frac{b}{1-b(1-t)}\Delta B = \frac{1-b}{1-b(1-t)}\Delta B.

Theorem 7.2 (Haavelmo’s Theorem, General Form). When government spending and lump-sum taxes both increase by ΔB\Delta B, output rises by:

ΔY=1b1b(1t)ΔB.\Delta Y^* = \frac{1-b}{1-b(1-t)}\Delta B.

With t=0t = 0 (lump-sum taxes only), this reduces to ΔY=1b1bΔB=ΔB\Delta Y^* = \frac{1-b}{1-b}\Delta B = \Delta B: the balanced budget multiplier is exactly 1.

Proof (general case, t=0t = 0):

ΔY=κGΔB+μT0ΔB=11bΔBb1bΔB=1b1bΔB=ΔB.\Delta Y^* = \kappa_G\Delta B + \mu_{T_0}\Delta B = \frac{1}{1-b}\Delta B - \frac{b}{1-b}\Delta B = \frac{1-b}{1-b}\Delta B = \Delta B. \square

The economic intuition: government spends every dollar of tax revenue, while households would have saved fraction (1b)(1-b). The government therefore contributes more to aggregate demand per dollar taxed than households would have. The net gain equals exactly the saved fraction: ΔY=1μT0=1b/(1b)(1b)=1\Delta Y^* = 1 - |\mu_{T_0}| = 1 - b/(1-b) \cdot (1-b) = 1... but wait — with t=0t = 0, μG=1/(1b)\mu_G = 1/(1-b) and μT0=b/(1b)|\mu_{T_0}| = b/(1-b), so ΔY=[1/(1b)b/(1b)]ΔB=ΔB\Delta Y^* = [1/(1-b) - b/(1-b)]\Delta B = \Delta B. The balanced budget multiplier is 1, independent of bb. A remarkable result.

Multiplier 6 — Investment multiplier:

μIˉ=YIˉ=11b(1t)=μG.\mu_{\bar{I}} = \frac{\partial Y^*}{\partial\bar{I}} = \frac{1}{1-b(1-t)} = \mu_G.

An autonomous increase in investment — an animal spirits boom [P:Ch.15.4] — has the same multiplied effect on output as an equivalent increase in government spending.


7.3 The Open-Economy Multiplier and Import Leakages

In an open economy, some of each round of induced spending falls on imports rather than domestically produced goods [P:Ch.26.5]. This import leakage reduces the multiplier.

With import function IM=m0+mYYIM = m_0 + m_Y Y (where mY>0m_Y > 0 is the marginal propensity to import), the open-economy equilibrium:

Y=a+b(YT)+Iˉ+G+Xm0mYY,Y = a + b(Y-T) + \bar{I} + G + X - m_0 - m_Y Y,

where XX is autonomous exports. Collecting:

Y[1b(1t)+mY]=Aˉopen.Y[1 - b(1-t) + m_Y] = \bar{A}^{open}.

Multiplier 7 — Open-economy government spending multiplier:

μGopen=11b(1t)+mY<μGclosed.\mu_G^{open} = \frac{1}{1-b(1-t)+m_Y} < \mu_G^{closed}.

The import leakage mYm_Y in the denominator reduces the multiplier: income generated by fiscal expansion partly flows abroad as import demand, weakening the domestic income circuit.

Definition 7.4 (Propensity to Spend on Domestic Output). Define b~=b(1t)mY\tilde{b} = b(1-t) - m_Y as the net marginal propensity to spend on domestic output — the fraction of each additional dollar of income that re-enters the domestic spending stream. The open-economy multiplier is simply:

μGopen=11b~.\mu_G^{open} = \frac{1}{1-\tilde{b}}.

This unifies all six multipliers: they all take the form 1/(1b~)1/(1-\tilde{b}) where b~\tilde{b} accounts for whatever leakages are present (saving, taxes, imports, and in the IS–LM context, the interest rate feedback via crowding out).

Table of leakages and their effects on multipliers:

Leakage sourceReduces denominator byEffect on μG\mu_G
Saving (MPS)+(1b)+(1-b)Reduces multiplier
Proportional tax+bt+btReduces multiplier
Import propensity+mY+m_YReduces multiplier
Interest crowding+brk/h+b_r k/hReduces multiplier (IS–LM)
Ricardian saving+b0=0+b\cdot 0 = 0?If full Ricardian equiv., 0\to 0

7.4 The Propensity to Spend: Sensitivity Analysis

The multiplier κ=1/(1b)\kappa = 1/(1-b) is extremely sensitive to the MPC bb near b=1b = 1:

dκdb=1(1b)2 as b1.\frac{d\kappa}{db} = \frac{1}{(1-b)^2} \to \infty \text{ as } b\to 1.

At b=0.75b = 0.75: κ=4\kappa = 4. At b=0.80b = 0.80: κ=5\kappa = 5. At b=0.90b = 0.90: κ=10\kappa = 10. At b=0.95b = 0.95: κ=20\kappa = 20.

This sensitivity has important implications for policy analysis. The MPC is not a structural constant — it varies across:

  1. Households by income and wealth: liquidity-constrained households have b1b \approx 1 (they spend every dollar of income); wealthy households have b0.3b \approx 0.30.5 (Kaplan et al., 2018, HANK model [P:Ch.25.3]).

  2. Type of fiscal transfer: lump-sum cash transfers have high MPCs for constrained recipients; corporate tax cuts have low MPCs if they flow to wealthy shareholders.

  3. Expectations about permanence: permanent income changes have higher MPCs than transitory ones (PIH, [P:Ch.11.2]).

The elasticity of the multiplier with respect to the MPC:

εκ,b=dκdbbκ=b(1b)21b1=b1b.\varepsilon_{\kappa,b} = \frac{d\kappa}{db}\cdot\frac{b}{\kappa} = \frac{b}{(1-b)^2}\cdot\frac{1-b}{1} = \frac{b}{1-b}.

At b=0.75b = 0.75: ε=3\varepsilon = 3. A 1% increase in the MPC raises the multiplier by 3%. This high elasticity means that the policy effectiveness of fiscal stimulus depends critically on who receives it — and whether recipients are constrained.


7.5 The Geometric Series Derivation: Round-by-Round Accounting

The multiplier formula κG=1/(1b)=n=0bn\kappa_G = 1/(1-b) = \sum_{n=0}^\infty b^n connects to a concrete narrative about how spending circulates through the economy.

Round 0: Government increases spending by ΔG=1\Delta G = 1. Output rises by 1.

Round 1: The dollar of output becomes income for workers and owners. They spend fraction bb: induced consumption ΔC1=b\Delta C_1 = b. Output rises by an additional bb.

Round 2: The additional bb of output becomes income. Fraction bb is spent: ΔC2=b2\Delta C_2 = b^2. Output rises by b2b^2.

Round nn: ΔCn=bn\Delta C_n = b^n.

Total: n=0bn=1/(1b)=κG\sum_{n=0}^\infty b^n = 1/(1-b) = \kappa_G.

The sum converges because b<1b < 1: each round the increment is smaller by factor bb, and the infinite sum is finite. If b=1b = 1 (no saving), the sum diverges — a $1\$1 spending becomes infinite output. If b=0b = 0 (all saving), the sum is 1 — the multiplier equals one because no induced spending occurs.

In APL, the round-by-round accumulation is a natural scan operation:

⎕IO←0 ⋄ ⎕ML←1

b ← 0.75
n_rounds ← 20

⍝ Round-by-round increments: b^0, b^1, ..., b^(n-1)
increments ← b * ⍳ n_rounds      ⍝ geometric sequence

⍝ Cumulative sum = partial sum of multiplier series
cumulative ← +\ increments        ⍝ scan: running total

⍝ Theoretical limit
kappa_G ← ÷ 1 - b                 ⍝ = 4.0

⍝ Convergence check: how many rounds to reach 99% of limit?
pct_of_limit ← cumulative ÷ kappa_G
n_99pct ← +/ pct_of_limit < 0.99  ⍝ count rounds below 99%
'Rounds to reach 99% limit: ' n_99pct    ⍝ ≈ 14 rounds for b=0.75
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7.6 Worked Example: The 2009 ARRA Multiplier

Cross-reference: Principles Ch. 28.2 (ARRA empirical evidence) [P:Ch.28.2]

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009) provided $787\$787 billion in stimulus over 10 years. A naive Keynesian cross calculation with b=0.75b = 0.75 and no leakages gives κG=4\kappa_G = 4 — the stimulus should have raised GDP by over $3\$3 trillion. The actual impact was far smaller. Why?

Calibrating with leakages:

Let b=0.75b = 0.75, t=0.28t = 0.28 (effective marginal federal plus state income tax rate), mY=0.12m_Y = 0.12 (import propensity), br=1.5b_r = 1.5 (investment-interest sensitivity), h=4h = 4 (interest semi-elasticity), k=0.5k = 0.5 (income elasticity of money demand).

IS–LM multiplier (closed):

μGclosed=hh(1b)+brk=44(0.25)+1.5×0.5=41+0.75=41.75=2.29.\mu_G^{closed} = \frac{h}{h(1-b)+b_r k} = \frac{4}{4(0.25)+1.5\times0.5} = \frac{4}{1+0.75} = \frac{4}{1.75} = 2.29.

Adding proportional tax:

μGtax=11b(1t)=110.75×0.72=10.46=2.17.\mu_G^{tax} = \frac{1}{1-b(1-t)} = \frac{1}{1-0.75\times0.72} = \frac{1}{0.46} = 2.17.

Adding imports (IS–LM with open economy):

μGopen,ISLM=hh(1b(1t)+mY)+brk(1b(1t)+mY)/(1).\mu_G^{open,\,IS-LM} = \frac{h}{h(1-b(1-t)+m_Y)+b_r k(1-b(1-t)+m_Y)/(1)}.

With the combined denominator (1b(1t)+mY)=0.46+0.12=0.58(1-b(1-t)+m_Y) = 0.46 + 0.12 = 0.58 replacing (1b)(1-b):

μGfull=hh0.58+brk=42.32+0.75=43.07=1.30.\mu_G^{full} = \frac{h}{h\cdot0.58 + b_r\cdot k} = \frac{4}{2.32+0.75} = \frac{4}{3.07} = 1.30.

At the ELB (estimated): With hh\to\infty (zero crowding out), the ELB multiplier:

μGELB=11b(1t)+mY=10.58=1.72.\mu_G^{ELB} = \frac{1}{1-b(1-t)+m_Y} = \frac{1}{0.58} = 1.72.

This is consistent with the Romer–Bernstein (2009) projection of 1.57 and the Nakamura–Steinsson (2014) cross-state estimate of approximately 1.5–2.0 [P:Ch.28.2].

The lesson: the naive multiplier of 4 reflects a closed economy at the liquidity trap with no taxes or imports. Each realistic modification reduces it. Fiscal policy remains stimulative, but the magnitude depends critically on the model calibration.

⎕IO←0 ⋄ ⎕ML←1

⍝ 1. Parameters
b ← 0.75   ⋄ t ← 0.28    ⋄ m_Y ← 0.12  
b_r ← 1.5  ⋄ h ← 4       ⋄ k ← 0.5

⍝ 2. Progressive multiplier calculations
⍝ Note: we use parentheses to ensure denominators are fully calculated before division
mu_naive ← ÷ 1 - b                                 ⍝ Simple: 4.0
mu_tax   ← ÷ 1 - b × 1 - t                         ⍝ + Tax leakage: ~2.17
mu_open  ← ÷ m_Y + 1 - b × 1 - t                   ⍝ + Import leakage: ~1.72

⍝ IS-LM Crowding out (Closed)
⍝ Formula: h / (h(1-b(1-t)) + br*k)
denom_closed ← (b_r × k) + h × 1 - b × 1 - t
mu_islm  ← h ÷ denom_closed

⍝ Full leakage (Open + Crowding Out)
⍝ Formula: h / (h(1-b(1-t) + m_y) + br*k)
denom_full ← (b_r × k) + h × m_Y + 1 - b × 1 - t
mu_full ← h ÷ denom_full

⍝ 3. Display as a table
labels ← 'Naive' 'Tax' 'Open(ELB)' 'ISLM(closed)' 'Full'
values ← mu_naive mu_tax mu_open mu_islm mu_full

'Multipliers under successive leakage assumptions:'
↑ labels ,¨ (⍕¨ 2 ⍕¨ values)
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7.7 Programming Exercises

Exercise 7.1 (APL — Full Multiplier Family)

Write a dfn all_multipliers ← {b t m_Y ← ⍵ ⋄ ...} that returns a 6-element vector (μG,μT0,μTR,μbalanced,μopen,μIˉ)(\mu_G, \mu_{T_0}, \mu_{TR}, \mu_{balanced}, \mu_{open}, \mu_{\bar{I}}) for parameters (b,t,mY)(b, t, m_Y). Verify: (a) μT0<μG|\mu_{T_0}| < \mu_G always; (b) μbalanced=(1b)/(1b(1t))1\mu_{balanced} = (1-b)/(1-b(1-t)) \leq 1; (c) μTR=bμG\mu_{TR} = b\cdot\mu_G.

Exercise 7.2 (Python — MPC Sensitivity)

import numpy as np, matplotlib.pyplot as plt

b_vals = np.linspace(0.01, 0.99, 500)
# Three multipliers as functions of b (t=0.25, m_Y=0.10)
t, m_Y = 0.25, 0.10
mu_closed = 1 / (1-b_vals)
mu_tax    = 1 / (1-b_vals*(1-t))
mu_open   = 1 / (1-b_vals*(1-t)+m_Y)

fig, ax = plt.subplots()
ax.plot(b_vals, mu_closed, label='Closed, no tax')
ax.plot(b_vals, mu_tax,    label='Closed, with tax t=0.25')
ax.plot(b_vals, mu_open,   label='Open, t=0.25, m_Y=0.10')
ax.axvline(0.75, linestyle='--', color='gray', alpha=0.5, label='b=0.75')
ax.set_ylim(0, 15); ax.set_xlabel('MPC (b)'); ax.set_ylabel('Multiplier')
ax.legend(); plt.title('Keynesian Multiplier vs. MPC'); plt.show()

Exercise 7.3 (Julia — Round-by-Round Convergence)

b = 0.80; n = 30
increments = b .^ (0:n-1)
cumulative = cumsum(increments)
limit = 1/(1-b)

println("Rounds to 90% of limit: ", findfirst(cumulative ./ limit .>= 0.90))
println("Rounds to 99% of limit: ", findfirst(cumulative ./ limit .>= 0.99))
println("Rounds to 99.9%:        ", findfirst(cumulative ./ limit .>= 0.999))
# Verify: at b=0.8, convergence is slower than b=0.75

Exercise 7.4 (R — ARRA Calibration Sweep)

# Sweep over (b, t, m_Y) to find range of plausible ARRA multipliers
b_vals <- seq(0.5, 0.9, 0.05)
t_vals <- seq(0.20, 0.35, 0.05)
m_Y    <- 0.12

# ELB multiplier: no crowding out
mu_grid <- outer(b_vals, t_vals, function(b, t) 1/(1-b*(1-t)+m_Y))
rownames(mu_grid) <- paste0("b=", b_vals)
colnames(mu_grid) <- paste0("t=", t_vals)
round(mu_grid, 2)

Exercise 7.5 — Haavelmo in the IS–LM Model (\star)

Prove that the balanced-budget multiplier in the IS–LM model (with ΔG=ΔT0=ΔB\Delta G = \Delta T_0 = \Delta B) equals:

μBBISLM=(1b)hh(1b)+brk.\mu_{BB}^{IS-LM} = \frac{(1-b)h}{h(1-b)+b_r k}.

Show that this is strictly less than 1 (unlike the Keynesian cross balanced-budget multiplier of 1) because the crowding-out effect also applies to the spending expansion. What is the limit as hh\to\infty (liquidity trap)? As h0h\to 0 (classical case)?

Exercise 7.6 — Negative Multiplier? (\star\star)

The “expansionary austerity” hypothesis (Alesina and Ardagna, 2010) suggests that fiscal consolidation can raise output through confidence effects [P:Ch.28.5]. Formally, model confidence as Iˉ(G)=Iˉ0γG\bar{I}(G) = \bar{I}_0 - \gamma G where γ>0\gamma > 0 (higher government spending reduces private investment via an uncertainty channel). (a) Derive the multiplier Y/G\partial Y^*/\partial G when confidence effects are present. (b) For what γ\gamma does the multiplier turn negative (contractionary fiscal expansion)? (c) Calibrate with b=0.75b = 0.75, t=0.25t = 0.25, γ=0.5\gamma = 0.5: does the multiplier change sign? Interpret.


7.8 Chapter Summary

Key results:

  • The Keynesian cross equilibrium is a fixed point of the expenditure function E(Y)\mathcal{E}(Y); the contraction mapping theorem guarantees existence and uniqueness when b<1b < 1.

  • The six multipliers for the closed economy with proportional taxes:

    • Spending: μG=1/[1b(1t)]\mu_G = 1/[1-b(1-t)]

    • Lump-sum tax: μT0=b/[1b(1t)]\mu_{T_0} = -b/[1-b(1-t)]

    • Transfer: μTR=b/[1b(1t)]\mu_{TR} = b/[1-b(1-t)]

    • Balanced budget: μBB=(1b)/[1b(1t)]1\mu_{BB} = (1-b)/[1-b(1-t)] \leq 1

    • Investment: μIˉ=μG\mu_{\bar{I}} = \mu_G

    • Open economy: μGopen=1/[1b(1t)+mY]\mu_G^{open} = 1/[1-b(1-t)+m_Y]

  • Haavelmo’s theorem: with lump-sum taxes and t=0t = 0, the balanced-budget multiplier is exactly 1, independent of the MPC.

  • Every multiplier takes the form 1/(1b~)1/(1-\tilde{b}) where b~\tilde{b} is the net marginal propensity to spend on domestic output, unifying all cases.

  • In APL: the round-by-round accumulation is +\ b * ⍳ n_rounds (scan of geometric sequence); the full multiplier table is generated via ∘.f outer product over parameter grids.

Connections forward: Chapter 9 derives the ELB multiplier — the analogous formula for the dynamic NK model at the zero lower bound, where crowding out is absent and forward-looking inflation expectations amplify the fiscal effect beyond 1/(1b~)1/(1-\tilde{b}).


Next: Chapter 8 — The AD–AS Model in Equation Form